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Scepticism about Intuition1 
 
Note. This is a late draft of the paper of the same title published in Sophie-Grace 
Chappell (ed): Intuition, Theory and Anti-Theory in Ethics (OUP, 2015) If 
quoting or citing please make check and make reference to the final published 
version.  
 
James Lenman 
 
Anyone who has ever tried to teach moral philosophy to a class of undergraduates 
knows how slippery talk of intuitions and intuitionism can be. Thus, as we all know, 
John Rawls in Political Liberalism defends what he calls political constructivism in 
opposition to a view that he characterizes as rational intuitionism and which he 
rejects.2 $W WKH VDPH WLPH 5DZOV¶ FULWLFV PRVW QRWDEO\ LQ WKLV UHJDUG R. M. Hare3, 
have castigated him for his disreputable intuitionism. Sometimes intuitionism refers to 
a fully fledged metaethical doctrine, paradigmatically represented by G. E. Moore and 
W. D. Ross, of robust nonnaturalistic realism. This is the intuitionism Rawls and Hare 
agree in repudiating. Sometimes it means something more modest, a take on moral 
epistemology which accepts the inescapable reliance of our moral thought on appeal, 
at some level, to moral intuitions, where this more specifically methodological 
intuitionism does not, by itself, commit one to any more particular metaethical view 
and can be made compatible with naturalistic realism or expessivism no less than with 
Moore-Ross style nonnaturalism. The result is a rather complicated dictionary entry; 
small wonder some students get confused.  
 
Intuitionism in the stronger sense has taken plenty of beatings over the years but even 
in the more modest and methodological sense it has no shortage of detractors. Many  
more recent critics of the latter are either exponents or enthusiasts of the currently 
WUHQGIRU³H[SHULPHQWDO HWKLFV´7KXV.ZDPH$QWKRQ\$SSLDKGHYRWHVDFKDSWHURI
his book Experiments in Ethics WRGHVFULELQJDQGGLVFXVVLQJZKDWWKDWFKDSWHU¶VWLWOH
FDOOV³7KH&DVH$JDLQVW,QWXLWLRQ´4 Much of this paper be addressed to some aspects 
of that supposed case (thougKZLWKQRSDUWLFXODUIRFXVXSRQ$SSLDK¶VDFFRXQWRILW 
  
Rawls is the man who gave us the sophisticated version of methodological 
intuitionism that goes by the name of the method of reflective equilibrium.5 Of course 
he was not the originator of the idea but adapted it from a view Nelson Goodman had 
already articulated in discussing the methodology of mathematics and logic.6 
 
Wherever we apply it we should be wary of understanding it in ways that accord an 
implausible level of authority to the raw and untutored gut reactions of the folk. The 
                                                 
1
  I am grateful to audiences at the Edinburgh conference on Intuition, Theory and Anti-Theory 
in Ethcs  and to the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar for helpful questions.  
2
  Rawls 1993, lecture III.  
3
  Hare 1989. 
4
  Appiah 2008, chapter 3. 
5
  See esp. his 1972, §§4, 9 and 87.  
6
  Goodman 1965. 
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currency of reflective equilibrium is considered judgements and these are very 
different things from gut reactions, things that need be neither raw nor untutored.7 
 
Fiddle here with a famous example.8 Suppose you know only one thing of me. You 
know: 
 
Lenman is a member of the Ramblers' Association. 
 
Now suppose you are asked to rank a bunch of propositions about me in order of 
probability in the light of this one thing you know. And suppose these propositions 
include: 
 
Lenman is a philosopher. 
 
And 
 
Lenman is a philosopher and he goes for regular country walks.  
 
Now the obvious relevance of the one thing you know to the latter proposition but not 
the former is liable to trick many of you into assigning it the higher probability of the 
two. Though perhaps not so many now that the experiment that uncovered this 
irrational disposition is so famous. And of course you would be irrational given that, 
as a short tutorial in basic probability theory (think about it, draw some Venn 
diagrams) would quickly convince you if you needed convincing, a conjunction 
cannot be more probable than one of its conjuncts.  
 
But of course this is no objection to the method of reflective equilibrium but simply 
an exercise in it. For the only sorts of intuitions that carry much weight in this method 
are those that are stably survive critical scrutiny and this sort of non-rational intuition 
about probability does not. Not at least if we are to understand critical scrutiny, as we 
certainly should, as including, for example, short tutorials in basic probability theory, 
short tutorials in which again appeal is made to intuitions that we hope will be more 
robust. 
 
But my focus here is not with the status or authority of intuitions in maths or 
metaphysics, say, but simply in ethics. Here the issues seem urgent as reliance on 
intuitions, and in particular on specifically moral intuitions, seems so thoroughly 
inescapable that it can seem a short route from scepticism about intuition to a quite 
general scepticism about ethics in general. Some philosophers have thought we could 
derive the content of ethics and morality from certain very thin norms of rationality, 
LQVRPHFDVHVSHUKDSVVLPSOHFRQVLVWHQF\DVLQ+DUH¶VFODLPWKDWWKHWKLQJFRXOGEH
pulled off rel\LQJRQQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQDVKHIDPRXVO\SXWLW³ORJLFDQGWKHIDFWV´9. 
Given this confidence Hare could comfortably condemn methodological intuitionism 
DV VLPSOH ³DUJXPHQW IURP UHFHLYHG RSLQLRQ´ )RU WKH UHVW RI XV ZKR ODFN +DUH¶V
                                                 
7
  This point is emphasized is Kaupinnen 2007 (though Kaupinnen is concerned primarily with 
specifically linguistic intuitions). Cf. Lenman 2007, pp. 63-64.  
8
  Tversky and Kahneman 1983. Offered as a source of concern for reflective equilibrium 
accounts of justification in Stich 1990, section 1.2.  
9
 Hare 1981, pp. 6,101ff 
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confidence in the posVLELOLW\ RI FUHGLEOH DOWHUQDWLYHV LW¶V KDUG WR VHH KRZ ZLWKRXW
some trust in what he called received opinion, we are to argue at all. 
 
7KH SRLQW LV QRW DOZD\V ZHOO WDNHQ 7KXV 3HWHU 6LQJHU LQ KLV SDSHU ³(WKLFV DQG
,QWXLWLRQV´ DWWDFNV PHWKRGRORJLFDO LQWXLtionism in favour of what he considers a 
³PRUHUHDVRQHG´XWLOLWDULDQDSSURDFKWRHWKLFV+HWKHQZULWHV 
 
,W PLJKW EH VDLG WKDW WKH UHVSRQVH WKDW , KDYH FDOOHG ³PRUH UHDVRQHG´ LV VWLOO
based on an intuition, for example the intuition that five deaths are worse than 
one, or more fundamentally, the intuition that it is a bad thing if a person is 
killed. But if this is an intuition it is different from the intuitions to which Haidt 
and Greene [in writings Singer has been drawing on] refer. We have already 
noteG+XPH¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDW³7KHUHLVQRVXFKSDVVLRQLQKXPDQPLQGVDVWKH
ORYH RI PDQNLQG PHUHO\ DV VXFK´ DQG DV ZH KDYH VHHQ WKHUH LV JRRG
HYROXWLRQDU\UHDVRQIRUZK\WKLVVKRXOGEHVR7KXVWKH³LQWXLWLRQ´WKDWWHOOVXV
that the death of one person is a lesser tragedy than the death of five is not like 
the intuitions that tell us [in the trolley problem] that we may throw the switch, 
but not push the stranger off the footbridge. It may be closer to the truth to say 
that it is a rational intuitions, somHWKLQJ OLNH WKH WKUHH ³HWKLFDO D[LRPV´ RU
³LQWXLWLYHSURSRVLWLRQVRIUHDOFOHDUQHVVDQGFHUWDLQW\´WRZKLFK+HQU\6LGJZLFN
appeals in his defense of utilitarianism in The Method of Ethics.10  
 
One is reminded of the irregular verbs so beloved of Bernard Woolley in Yes 
Minister.11 He has gut reactions. You make unsupported appeals to intuitions. I reply 
only on ethical axioms of real clearness and certainty. Perhaps the thought is that the 
LQWXLWLRQV WKDWJURXQG6LQJHU¶VXWLOLWDULDQLVPDUH MXVWPRUH LQWXLWLYHOy compelling or 
more robust under critical scrutiny than the more deontological intuitions that make us 
so scrupulous about pushing fat men off bridges. But that again is not a critique of  
methodological intuitionism so much as an exercise in it, just as when the intuitions 
that support such basic mathematical facts as that a conjunction cannot be more likely 
than one of its conjuncts seem compelling and robust enough to outweigh any 
disposition we may have to make intuitive judgements that conflict with them.12 
                                                 
10
  Singer 2005, pp. 350-351. For valuable critiques of what Singer says this paper see Sandberg 
and Juth 2011, Berker 2009  
11
  ³,KDYHDQLQGHSHQGHQWPLQG\RXDUHDQHFFHQWULFKHLVURXQGWKHWZLVW´One of Us, Yes, 
Prime Minister, series 1, first broadcast 27th February, 1986); ³I give confidential briefings, you leak, 
KH
VEHLQJFKDUJHGXQGHUVHFWLRQ$RIWKH2IILFLDO6HFUHWV$FW´Man Overboard, Yes, Prime 
Minister, series 2, first broadcast 3rd  December, 1987). Cf. Griffin 1995. 
12
  At p. 347 of his 2005, Singer seems to anticipate this kind of response and suggests it makes 
the method of reflective equilibrium trivial, no longer representing a distinctive approach to moral 
epistemology  with which a foundationalist moral epistemology stands in clear contrast. I guess a bit 
here depends oQKRZZHXQGHUVWDQGµIRXQGDWLRQDOLVW¶,¶PQRWP\VHOIDIRXQGDWLRQDOLVWLQVRIDUDV,
DFFHSWWKHPHWKRGRORJLFDOLQWXLWLRQ¶VFODLPWKDWPRUDOLQTXLU\FDQQRWJHWXVYHU\IDUXQOHVVZHDSSHDO
at some point to substantive moral intuitions. Others might be foundationalists in accepting the view 
described already where the only intuitions we need are extra-moral, perhaps simply logical, appeals to 
constraints of consistency and other comparably formal and prima facie morally neutral rational 
constraints. This sort RIPRUDOµORJLFLVP¶LQDSSO\LQJWKHWHUPLQWKLVFRQWH[W,IROORZ*LEEDUGLV
a possible position in moral epistemology. As noted above, Hare at least came close to holding a 
version of it and Gibbard (ibid.) takes Christine Korsgaard to do likewise,GRQ¶WP\VHOIEHOLHYHPRUDO
logicism is true and my talk of methodological intuitionism is not intended to include it though I am 
happy to allow that it is possible to characterize it as still, in principle, in the business of reflective 
equilibrium on a very wide construal of the latter. But all this has nothing to do with my objection  to 
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There is also the suggestion that what distinguishes the intuitions Singer likes from 
those he does not is the availability of an evolutionary explanation for the latter but 
not the former. There is much to question here. First it is not the case that, as Singer 
seems to suppose13, that we find ourselves wholly at a loss for evolutionary 
explanations of a disposition to entertain and approve altruistic sentiments directed 
TXLWHJHQHUDOO\DWRQH¶VIHOORZKXPDQFUHDWXUHV7KHZRUNLQJVRILQGLUHFWUHFLSUocity 
where the adaptive benefits of reputation and/or the operation of sexual selection can 
furnish one such explanation, forms of group selection another.14 More 
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\DV:LOOLDP)LW]3DWULFNQRWHV³,IRXUKRPLQLPDQFHVWRUVWHQGHGWR
live in FLUFXPVWDQFHV ZKHUH WKH RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU ³ZDVWLQJ´ DOWUXLVP LQ QRQ-fitness 
HQKDQFLQJ ZD\V HJ RQ µRXWVLGHUV¶ ZHUH VXIILFLHQWO\ IHZ DQG IDU EHWZHHQ WKHQ D
simple, undiscriminating (though limited) sense of concern and altruism may have 
promoted fitness at far less cost than more discriminating forms, evolving more 
UHDGLO\´15  
 
Secondly, we should be wary of any assumption that where there is an evolutionary 
explanation for why we have some intuitions, that need necessarily debunk it. There 
may very plausibly be evolutionary explanations for why we value certain virtues, 
say, without that suggesting we ought not to value them. Just as, while there is 
certainly an evolutionary explanation for why we like sex, most of us are liable to find 
that our fondness for sex is robust in the face of understanding this. (And perhaps not 
just our fondness for it but also our judgement that it has a significant role to play in a 
good human life.)  
 
Thirdly, it may be allowed that sometimes indeed evolutionary explanations plausibly 
do debunk. Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion flirts with the idea that the 
religious impulse is a by-product of the irrational but sometimes adaptive 
psychological disposition we have to intense erotic love.16 Such debunking 
explanations have an obvious appeal to atheists. Theists, assuming they are not hostile 
to evolutionary theory, may favour less debunking explanations where religious belief 
is seen as an autonomous application of human intelligence.17 Perhaps our ancestors 
derived adaptive advantage from being good at observing and good at reasoning and 
smart perceptive people are likely to encounter and respond to the compelling 
evidence and sound reasoning that favours theistic belief. But note how, here and 
plausibly elsewhere, the relative appeal of the debunking and vindicating explanations 
LV QRW LQGHSHQGHQW RI RXU SULRU FRPPLWPHQWV $ 'DZNLQV ZLOO UHMHFW WKH WKHLVW¶V
explanation because he denies that there is any such sound evidence or any such 
sound reasoning to be had. A moral sceptic may favour, just because she is a moral 
sceptic, debunking explanations of the evolution of morality. A moral rationalist will 
naturally see our moral sensibility as a by-product of the fact that we are intelligent 
and perceptive and explain these quite general cognitive endowments in familiar 
ZD\V 6LQJHU¶V FRQYLFWLRQ WKDW GHRQWRORJLFDO LQWXLWLRQV KDYH D peculiarly debunking 
                                                                                                                                            
Singer. My objection to Singer is that he very clearly does appeal to substantive moral, not merely 
logical, intuitions and so is no less a coherentist than I, whetever he may say.   
13
  See especially Singer 2005, pp. 334-335. 
14
  See Joyce 2006, pp. 31-44.  
15
  FitzPatrick 2008, §2.2 Cf. Dawkins 2006, pp. 220-221; Kitcher 2006. 
16
  Dawkins 2006, pp. 184-187.  
17
  FitzPatrick 2008 §§2.4 and 4. 
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evolutionary explanation as compared to their consequentialist rivals is as plausibly a 
reflection of his prior philosophical commitments as an independent source of support 
for them.  
 
Singer is impressed in this context by the experimental work of Joshua Greene who 
thinks distinctively deontological intuitions reflect a particular squeamishness we feel 
about inflicting harm in ways WKDWDUHDV*UHHQHSXWVLW³XSFORVHDQGSHUVRQDO´WKH
sort of harm involved where I push you off a high bridge as opposed to harms I inflict 
on remote and unidentified strangers.18 As Selim Berker has emphasized in a telling 
critique of the claims made by Singer and Greene, it is ludicrous to suppose that this 
criterion is remotely adequate to characterize a general distinguishing characteristic of 
distinctively deontological moral judgements.19 Insofar as we can identify such an 
impulse as at work in some of our moral thinking, that would indeed have a 
debunking effect. But as Berker also emphasizes20, in doing so we rely crucially on a 
³VXEVWDQWLYHQRUPDWLYHLQWXLWLRQ´WKDWZHDUULYHDWIURPWKHDUPFKDLUWRWKHHIIHFWWKDW
how up-close and personal our harming of others is has no moral relevance.  
 
$QGRIFRXUVHLW¶VQRWDQREMHFWLRQWRPHWKRGRORJLFDOLQWXLWLRQLVPWKDWZHPLJKWWDNH
considerable interest in where our intuitions come from. If reflective equilibrium is to 
be wide, we should expect no less. Thus suppose you tell me that your brother often 
gives sizeable donations to charity and I find this somehow morally discomfiting. 
$VNHGZK\ ,¶PDELW DW D ORVVEXWFRRNXSVRPHVWRU\DERXWKRZ You know, I just 
FDQ¶WVWDQGWKHVHULJKWHRXVGR-gooder types. You then tell me that what has happened 
is that Thalia Wheatley and Jonathan Haidt have conditioned me under hypnosis to 
IHHO GLVJXVW ZKHQHYHU , KHDU WKH ZRUG ³RIWHQ´21 Given this debunking explanation, 
,¶POLNHO\LI,¶PDWDOOVHQVLEOHWRUHYLVHP\MXdgement.  
 
2ULIDUDWKHUELJLISHUKDSVZHZHUHWREHFRQYLQFHGE\+DUPDQ¶VH[SODQDWLRQRI
the intuitive appeal of the helping-not harming distinction in moral philosophy as 
serving the interests of the relatively powerful who enjoyed a disproportionate 
influence in the process of bargaining which has, on his view, given shape to our 
moral code, we might sensibly fear for the credibility of these intuitions.22 So of 
course we are sensitive to considerations about the causal origins of our intuitions. 
And, as I have stressed already, it is surely an odd idea that evolutionary explanations, 
as such, are debunking in this context. There are plausibly evolutionary explanations 
not only for many, perhaps, all the vilest and most appalling features of human nature 
but also for many of the finest and most admirable such features. (Of course in saying 
that I merely express a sensibility that is itself the product of contingent evolutionary 
processes. Indeed, but so what?23) 
 
Other empirical data sometimes thought to make trouble for methodological 
intuitionism involve what is called dumbfounding where we have intuitions we are at 
a loss to explain. The standard example involves a case where a brother and sister, 
both single, engage in a happy and consensual one-off act of incestuous sexual 
                                                 
18
  *UHHQH¶VYLHZVDUHVHWRXW in Greene 2008 
19
  Berker 2009. esp. pp. 311-313. 
20
  Ibid., p. 322.  
21
  See Wheatley and Haidt 2005. Discussed by Appiah 2008, pp. 86-87.  
22
  Harman 1977, p. 111.  
23
  Cf Lenman 1999, Street 2012.  
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intercourse, carefully using contraceptive precautions, from which no one comes to 
any harm. This is a case, we are told, where people find it very hard to make good 
ethical sense of the disapproval they are frequently strongly disposed to feel.24  
 
In fact, as Dan Jacobson has convincingly urged, this is really not so hard and the idea 
that it is is based on a hopelessly crude conception of the connection between harm 
and moral wrongness.25  But that is not quite the point I want to stress here. My point 
is that this again just illustrates, rather than undermining, methodological intuitionism 
in ways already familiar from the practice of contemporary moral philosophy. To take 
the clearest example, consider the trolley problem. This is a classic case of 
dumbfounding where we are strongly disposed to feel there is an important moral 
difference between certain kinds of cases but find it very hard to give an intuitive 
UDWLRQDOHIRUWKDWGLIIHUHQFH7KLVGRHVQ¶WXQGHUPLQHRXUWUXVWLQLQWXLtion but simply 
defines a research project of seeking such a rationale and perhaps, revising, as Judith 
Jarvis Thomson herself recently did26, our belief in the original intuition where the 
rationale proves too stubbornly elusive for too long. When we pursue a research 
project of this kind we may surely properly dismiss what we are up to as 
³FRQIDEXODWLRQ´RQO\LIZHDUHVDWLVILHGWKDWWKHUDWLRQDOHVZHDUULYHDWDUHSRRURQHV
unable to survive reflective scrutiny. And that is a matter not for empirical psychology 
but for philosophy.  
 
Then there is the range of phenomena most loved by some contemporary sceptics 
about methodological intuitionism, the phenomena known as framing effects where 
the judgements we make on certain ethical questions seem to prove sensitive to the 
ways questions are put, the order in which they are posed and other intuitively 
irrelevant contextual features.27 A fine illustration is again furnished by the writers of 
Yes Prime Minister. Sir Humphrey is vexed when Bernard Woolley informs him how 
WKH30¶VSODQVWRUHLQWURGXFH1DWLRQDO6ervice have been favoured in an opinion poll 
and demands that another poll be conducted with a different result. Bernard is 
SX]]OHG+RZZLOOVLPSO\KROGLQJDQRWKHUSROOFKDQJHDQ\RQH¶VPLQG"6LU+XPSKUH\
explains. 
 
Sir Humphrey: "You know what happens: nice young lady comes up to you. 
Obviously you want to create a good impression, you don't want to look a 
fool, do you? So she starts asking you some questions: Mr. Woolley, are you 
worried about the number of young people without jobs?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "Are you worried about the rise in crime among teenagers?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "Do you think there is a lack of discipline in our 
comprehensive schools?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "Do you think young people welcome some authority and 
leadership in their lives?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "Do you think they respond to a challenge?" 
                                                 
24
  See Haidt 2001. Numerous discussions include Singer 2005, pp. 337ff. 
25
  Jacobson, forthcoming. Cf. FitzPatrick 2008, §2.5. 
26
  Thomson 2008. 
27
  Discussed by Appiah 2008, pp. 82-86. A locus classicus is Tversky and Kahneman 1981.  
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Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "Would you be in favour of reintroducing National Service?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Oh...well, I suppose I might be." 
Sir Humphrey: "Yes or no?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "Of course you would, Bernard. After all you've told her, you 
can't say no to that. So they don't mention the first five questions and they 
publish the last one." 
Bernard Woolley: "Is that really what they do?" 
Sir Humphrey: "Well, not the reputable ones no, but there aren't many of 
those. So alternatively the young lady can get the opposite result." 
Bernard Woolley: "How?" 
Sir Humphrey: "Mr. Woolley, are you worried about the danger of war?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "Are you worried about the growth of armaments?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "Do you think there is a danger in giving young people guns 
and teaching them how to kill?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "Do you think it is wrong to force people to take up arms 
against their will?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "Would you oppose the reintroduction of National Service?" 
Bernard Woolley: "Yes" 
Sir Humphrey: "There you are, you see Bernard. The perfect balanced 
sample."28 
 
Again, it seems, there is little in such phenomena as this to disturb the methodological 
intuitionist. What Sir Humphrey has done here is just administer quite a good 
philosophy tutorial.  Again recall that we are not concerned with gut reactions but 
with considered judgements that are stable under reflective scrutiny. Bernard, in the 
exchange above, has just discovered that his beliefs about national service are not so 
stable and the variation in frame that makes this apparent to him is precisely one of 
the forms reflective scrutiny often takes. Once again, Bernard has a new research 
project, that of arriving at a judgement on this question he is prepared to stand by 
consistently across precisely such changes in frame.  
 
Consider finally the phenomenon of ethical disagreement. The literature on 
experimental ethics is thick with documentation of ethical disagreements both across 
and within cultures.29 But of course disagreement by itself shows very little. The 
pursuit of reflective equilibrium, properly conceived, is an interpersonal, not an 
intrapersonal enterprise. The mere fact of disagreement, rather than undermining it, is 
in large measure what gives it its point, insofar as it is the most rational way we have 
of seeking to resolve disagreement. How well it works, of course, is open to dispute.  
 
Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund are the leading exponents of a view they call 
social intuitionism (thus, alas,  making tKH GLFWLRQDU\ HQWU\ IRU µLQWXLWLRQLVP¶ VWLOO
                                                 
28
  The Ministerial Broadcast, Yes, Prime Minister, series 1 (first broadcast 16th January, 1986). 
29
  See e.g. Doris and Plakias 2008. 
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more confusing) and which, simplifying considerably, involves a high degree of 
pessimism of the role of reason in intrapersonal moral thought.30 Their pessimism is 
qualified in two ways. First, rather flatteringly, they suggest it may not apply to 
professional moral philosophers with their high levels of training in moral reasoning. 
Secondly they are much less pessimistic about the role reason can play in 
interpersonal moral reasoning.  
 
Such optimism is easily questioned. Thus -DFREVRQGLVFXVVLQJ+DLGWDQG%MRUNOXQG¶V
claims, writes: 
 
Even casual observations of group psychology suggest that moral discourse 
between like-minded individuals tends not merely to reinforce their judgements 
but to make them more radical. People who converse only with those who 
roughly share their ideological perspective tend to become both more confident 
and more extreme in their views. This explains the emergence of bien pensant 
opinion ± that is, those opinions shared by some parish and widely assumed to 
be shared by all its right thinking members ±whether in the culture at large or in 
subcultural cliques (such as academia). Furthermore, since it is flattering to have 
RXU RSLQLRQV ³FRQILUPHG´ E\ RWKHUV KRZHYHU GXELRXV WKLV FRQILUPDWLRn, we 
tend to seek out the like-minded rather than testing our views against the 
strongest opposing positions. 
 
$VWKHUHIHUHQFHWRDFDGHPLDVXJJHVWV-DFREVRQDOVRTXHVWLRQV+DLGWDQG%MRUNOXQG¶V
optimism about the rationality of moral philosophers. An even stronger statement of 
pessimism on the latter score is articulated by the controversial American jurist 
Richard Posner, the early parts of whose book The Problematics of Moral and Legal 
Theory is a rather splendidly provocative and stimulating philippic against the 
standard pretensions of my own profession. Academic moral philosophy, Posner 
urges, is a futile and pointless activity in which we philosophers engage in empty 
ideological posturing dressed up in fancy language, the application of classic 
philosophical texts to contemporary social contexts where they are of almost no 
relevance and an epistemologically bankrupt appeal to uncheckable intuitions.31 
Comparisons of moral philosophical inquiry to science can, only, Posner urges, be 
profoundly embarrassing to the former when we compare and contrast what these two 
enterprises have achieved and contributed. To the limited extent to which he 
recognizes such a phenomenon as moral progress, he thinks moral philosophy 
contributes nothing to effecting it but is simply epiphenomenal on social phenomena 
that occur independently, including the activity of what he calls µmoral entrepreneurs¶ 
who are seldom academics and whose success depends almost wholly on rhetorical, 
nonrational methods of persuasion.  
 
Thomas Kuhn was famously characterized by Imre Lakatos as representing scientific 
change not as the rational process of discovery captured in the optimistic descriptions 
of scientific methodology supplied by such thinkers as Hempel and Popper but as a 
                                                 
30
  Haidt and Bjorklund 2008 
31
  Sometimes Posner writes as if he were somehow championing raw intuition against the 
LQWUXVLYHVFUXWLQ\RIWKHRU\³1RRQHKDVWRVXUUHQGHUKLVPRUDOLQWXLWLRQVWRPRUDOWKHRU\´
p.51). But it seems clear from his remarks on e.g. p. 60 that his scepticism is grounded, at least in part, 
in a strong sense of the epistemic uselessness of appeals to intuition..  
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largely nonrDWLRQDOSURFHVVRI³PRESV\FKRORJ\´32 The sort of pessimism articulated 
by Jacobson and Posner might be understood as the claim that, whatever we think of 
the scientific case, just this is true of moral philosophy. Is it? Academic philosophical 
argument is QRWXQLIRUPLQTXDOLW\DQG,GRQ¶WPXFKGRXEWWKHFKDUJHDJDLQVWLWLVDW
least sometimes fair, perhaps most frequently where it touches on social issues where 
the ideological temperature runs high, but need it always be? 
 
3RVQHU¶VFDVHDJDLQVWµDFDGHPLFPRUDOL]LQJ¶DVKHFDOOVLWLVOLYHO\EXWLQFRQFOXVLYH
At times he appears to express a conviction of the pointlessness and futility of moral 
argument:  
 
Every move in normative moral argument can be checked by a countermove. 
The discourse of moral theory is interminable because it is indeterminate.33 
 
%XWRQHVWULNLQJIHDWXUHRIKLVGLVFXVVLRQLVWKDWKHKLPVHOIFDQ¶WUHVLVWJHWWLQJVWXFN
LQ7KXVKHFRQVLGHUVDQGDWWDFNV-XGLWK-DUYLV7KRPVRQ¶VFODVVLFGHIHQFHRIDERUWLRQ
by means of an analogy to a bizarre imagined case where one finds oneself compelled 
to spend nine months of immobility acting as a life-support system for an ailing 
violinist. His first objection is just to the bizarre nature of the example. In such cases, 
remote from our experience, we FDQKDYHQR³VHWWOHGRUUHOLDEOHLQWXLWLRQV´$UHDGHU
might wonder whether, in saying this, he does not  appear to imply  that, in other, less 
IDQFLIXOFDVHVLQWXLWLRQVFDQEHµUHOLDEOH¶LQVRPHVHQVH+HREMHFWVIXUWKHUWKDWWKH
analogy is badly flawed. Expectant mothers are not immobilized by pregnancy. The 
foetus is no stranger: you are its mum. And abortion is very different from simply 
unplugging oneself from a connection to a violinist, an active form of killing, not a 
mere allowing to die.34 
 
Whatever the merits of these points, it is natural to observe that Posner, in the very 
course of objecting to the characteristic activity of academic moralists, comes very 
close to joining in. He would, I conjecture, respond to this point by invoking the 
distinction between the critical and constructive employment of moral theory, where 
he seems somewhat less sceptical about the former than the latter.35 And yet these 
activities are not always so distinct. Since Socrates, a primary means for the testing of 
moral ideas has been to test their robustness in the face of attempted refutation. 
Moreover to acknowledge the possibility of critical moral theorizing is to 
acknowledge that reason has something to do here. And this is surely true. Much later 
in his book, discuVVLQJ'XQFDQ.HQQHG\¶VVFHSWLFLVPDERXWSXEOLFSROLF\DUJXPHQWV
Posner writes: 
 
Kennedy is wrong. Although one can always argue both sides of an issue of 
policy, the arguments for one side may fall completely flat. I would like to see 
Kennedy argue for raising the minimum wage to $50 an hour.36  
 
The same is surely true of ethics and of ethical arguments. There are some ethical 
ideas that are just plain stupid for which there is simply nothing to be said. That sex, 
                                                 
32
  Lakatos 1970, p. 178.  
33
  Posner 1999, p. 53. 
34
  Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
35
  Ibid., pp. 15-16.  
36
  Ibid., p. 267.  
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any kind of sex in any circumstances, is morally wrong, that it is wicked to perform or 
to enjoy any kind of music, that the homicide law of ancient Cyme was just37, these 
are stupid ideas in defence of which there is nothing credible to be said.  
 
Posner sort of agrees: 
 
When moral claims are founded on testable hypotheses ± when, in other 
words, they are defended as functional ± a space is created for moral criticism 
based on empirical investigation. We can then employ the moral premises of 
the culture whose morality is at issue, and reasoning from common premises, 
reach a conclusion that our local interlocutor may be forced as a matter of 
logic to accept (if he is logical). If the only reason that virgins are hurled into 
volcanoes is to make crops grow, empirical investigation should dislodge the 
practice.38 
 
Of course not all normative ethical theory need pretend to universality. Such theorists 
as Michael Walzer and, especially in his later writings, Rawls make no claim to be 
doing more than exploring and developing the moral self-understanding of our own 
society in all its historical contingency. As I stressed at the outset, the issue of 
whether to accept the kind of robust realism sometimes denoted by talk of 
intuitionism is distinct from the more narrowly methodological issue of the legitimacy 
of an appeal to intuitions. 
 
That said, there may be objections to the use of intuitions that are specific to particular 
metaethical understandings of it. This is certainly true of the more robust forms of 
realism where intuitions are taken to be a quasi-perceptual form of cognition by which 
we are somehow able to scrutinize a domain of moral truths constituted prior to and 
independently of any interest we may take in it. Insofar as it is this story Posner 
considers epistemologically bankrupt, he has a lot of company, not least among many 
practitioners of the so-called academic moralism he is criticising.  
 
However other metaethical understandings of moral inquiry may understand appeals 
to intuition in ways that are less vulnerable to this charge. Indeed, in another paper, I 
have argued that just this is true of expressivism and that its truth should count as a 
VWURQJ GLDOHFWLFDO VWULNH LQ WKDW WKHRU\¶V IDYRXU39  On my own expressivist view of 
metaethics, moral intuition emerges as a wholly unmysterious phenomenon. For the 
expressivist, intuitions are simply desires, or a particular species of desire, broadly 
understood. When I say I have an intuition that murder or rape or torture is wrong, 
what I express is not, fundamentally, a belief at all but rather my state of 
unwillingness to accept as a set of rules to govern my actions± or indeed any 
community's actions ± any set of rules that did not prohibit such deeds. The practice 
of moral inquiry can then be conceived, intrapersonally, as the attempt to impose 
coherence on these desires where they conflict; interpersonally as the attempt to 
deepen and to extend our communities of judgement by seeking to resolve 
interpersonal conflicts of the same sort. This enterprise is difficult and always to an 
extent ad hominem. We look for enough normative common ground with our 
interlocutors to give us dialectical purchase in areas where we disagree. (With some 
                                                 
37
  Aristotle: Politics 1269a1, an example made much of by Martha Nussbaum in her 1988. 
38
  Posner 1999, pp. 21-22.  
39
  Lenman 2007. 
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interlocutors this may be hard work and it is sometimes indeed all too tempting to stay 
at home, as Posner castigates academic moralists for doing, and preach to the 
ideological choir.40)  
 
In this way expressivism offers to make unmysterious what other metaethical views 
may threaten to leave entirely mysterious. But perhaps there are other objections to 
this, highly metaphysically unassuming conception of moral inquiry. I will close by 
QRWLQJRQH,W¶VHDV\WRVHHWKHIRUFHRIWKHZRUU\WKDWVFLHQFHPLJKWMXVWEHMXVWPRE
psychology. The worry would seem to be that rather than being what we all hoped it 
was, a rational cognitive enterprise whereby we successfully engage with an order of 
truths constituted prior to and independently of our engagement with it by procedures 
which reliably track such truths, at least most of the time, all we have is just a kind of 
politics. The metaphysically ambitious philosophical intuitionist can raise, and (she no 
doubt hopes) address, the same concern, explicated by means of the same contrast. 
But can the expressivist even make clear sense of the problem? For the expressivist, 
quasi-realist niceties to one side, there is no such prior and independent order of moral 
truth and there is little for moral inquiry, philosophical or otherwise, to be, other than 
an effectively political process whereby we try to secure agreement on a set of shared 
mRUDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJV DFFHSWDEOH WR DOO RI XV $QG LI WKDW¶V ULJKW VRPHRQH PLJKW
wonder, what is left for the charge that moral philosophy is simply mob psychology to 
amount to? The answer of course has to be that we do not here ± for we cannot -
distinguish merely political processes from something else. Rather the distinction we 
need is one inside politics: we need a story whereby we distinguish different kinds of 
SROLWLFDO SURFHVV LGHQWLI\LQJ WKRVH ZH KRSH RXU VRFLHW\¶V PRUDO FRQYHUVDWLRQV ZLOO
exemplify and others we do not. Wherever possible we should prefer conversations to 
violent conflict. Wherever possible we should prefer conversations that include 
everyone in our community (at least) and not just members of privileged proper 
subsets. Wherever possible we should prefer conversations where we seek to secure 
RXU LQWHUORFXWRUV¶ DJUHHPHQW E\ DUJXPHQWV ± understood generously so as include 
DSSHDOVWRRXULQWHUORFXWRUV¶PRUDOLPDJLQDWLRQDVZHOODVWKHLUPRUHQDUURZO\UDWLRQDO
capacities ± rather than by simply bullying or browbeating them. Wherever possible 
holders even ± one might perhaps say especially - of unpopular or difficult opinions 
should be permitted to air them, where unpopular and difficult opinions might include 
dissent from the very normative judgements these few sentences have aired. Such 
thoughts could be developed in various ways, perhaps by articulating, in a roughly 
Habermasian spirit, norms that we would wish to guide our moral conversations, 
perhaps by developing a virtue-theoretical account of the qualities of character to be 
desired in its participants. Such development is the business of moral epistemology 
and to that extent a part of metaethics but it is also a part of ethics, itself already 
moralized through and through.41 Even in airing the very modest norms of moral 
conversation I have just mentioned, I am simply putting some more moral intuitions 
on the table²though they are intuitions I hope you share and, even if you do not, I 
hope we may share enough in the way of other things that it need not always prove 
futile for us to discuss them.    
 
 
 
                                                 
40
  See especially 1999, p. 90.  
41
  Cf. Lenman 2012.. 
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